Additional information
by Kathleen Burk (Author), Alec Cairncross (Author)
In this authoritative and gripping book--the first full account of the 1976 International Monetary Fund crisis--Kathleen Burk and Alec Cairncross peel back the surface of the most searing economic crisis of postwar Britain to reveal its historical roots and contemporary context. During the spring of 1976, the plummeting value of the British pound against the U.S. dollar triggered a traumatic economic and political crisis. International confidence in the pound collapsed; an article in the Wall Street Journal, headlined "Good-bye, Great Britain," urged investors to get out of sterling. Refused aid by the London and New York markets, the Labour Government under Prime Minister James Callaghan was forced to turn for help to the IMF--a highly unusual move for a developed Western economy. Fearing that the economic crisis would drive Britain into a left-wing siege economy which would endanger NATO and the EEC, the United States and Germany used the IMF loan as a means to force Britain to make major domestic policy changes; when the IMF mission arrived in London in November 1976, it was announced that the price for the loan included deep cuts in domestic spending. Burk and Cairncross uncover the maneuvers of the Labour Government to evade IMF conditions. They also examine underlying economic factors, the political agenda, the rise of monetarist ideas, and the Keynesian response. Juxtaposing narrative with analysis, they provide surprising answers to critical questions and reveal how the breakdown of the post-war consensus on the macroeconomic management paved the way for the triumph of Thatcherism.
Back Jacket
In March 1976 the value of the British pound began to slide. The slide turned into a rout and triggered an economic and political trauma. By September confidence in the pound had collapsed. In April 1975 the Wall Street Journal had run the headline 'Goodbye, Great Britain, ' advising investors to get out of sterling. Now the British Labour government under its new Prime Minister James Callaghan was forced to seek help from the International Monetary Fund, a familiar option for Third World countries but highly unusual for a developed western economy. This expert new study uncovers the roots of the most searing economic crisis of postwar Britain. The weakness and instability of the British economy in the mid-1970s, the consequence in part of the 1973 rise in oil prices, raised international alarm. The US government in particular feared economic crisis would drive Britain into a left-wing siege economy, endangering NATO and the EEC. Anticipating the danger, the US Treasury set out to force Britain to make major domestic policy changes. The sterling crisis provided the opportunity. The IMF provided the weapon. Arriving in London in November 1976, the IMF mission announced that the price for the loan included deep cuts in public expenditure. The consequent political crisis was fought out in private and in public, amongst members of the British Cabinet, the Labour Party, the Treasury and the Bank of England. It involved the US President, Treasury and State Department, the Federal Reserve, the German Chancellor and the Bundesbank. Burk and Cairncross uncover the efforts of the Labour government to escape IMF conditions. They also examine the political agenda, the loss of economic control, therise of monetarist ideas and the change in the climate of opinion. Juxtaposing gripping narrative with expert analysis, the book provides surprising answers to critical questions and reveals how the breakdown of the postwar consensus on macro-economic management paved the way for the triumph of Thatcherism.
