{"product_id":"on-evidence-in-philosophy-hardcover-2","title":"On Evidence in Philosophy - Hardcover","description":"\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cp style=\"text-align: right;\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"https:\/\/reportcopyrightinfringement.com\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\"\u003e\u003cb\u003eReport copyright infringement\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/a\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003c\/div\u003e\u003cp\u003eby \u003cb\u003eWilliam G. Lycan\u003c\/b\u003e (Author)\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn this book William G. Lycan offers an epistemology of philosophy itself, a partial method for philosophical inquiry. The epistemology features three ultimate sources of justified philosophical belief. First, common sense, in a carefully restricted sense of the term-the sorts of contingent propositions Moore defended against idealists and skeptics. Second, the deliverances of well confirmed science. Third and more fundamentally, intuitions about cases in a carefully specified sense of that term. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003eThe first half of \u003cem\u003eOn Evidence in Philosophy\u003c\/em\u003e expounds a version of Moore's method and applies it to each of several issues. This version is shown to resist all the standard objections to Moore; most of them do not even apply. It is argued, in Chapters 5 and 6, that philosophical method is far less powerful than most have taken it to be. In particular, deductive argument can accomplish very little, and hardly ever is an opposing position refuted except by common sense or by science. The final two chapters defend the evidential status of intuitions and the Goodmanian method of reflective equilibrium; it is argued that philosophy always and everywhere depends on them. The method is then set within a more general explanatory-coherentist epistemology, which is shown to resist standard forms of skepticism. \u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003eIn sum, William G. Lycan advocates a picture of philosophy as a very wide explanatory reflective equilibrium incorporating common sense, science, and our firmest intuitions on any topic-and nothing more, not ever.\u003ch3\u003eAuthor Biography\u003c\/h3\u003e\u003cp\u003eWilliam G. Lycan, \u003cem\u003eWilliam Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor Emeritus\/Distinguished Visiting Professor, University of North Carolina\/University of Connecticut\u003c\/em\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003eWilliam G. Lycan is William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University of North Carolina and currently Distinguished Visiting Professor at the University of Connecticut. He is author of \u003cem\u003eLogical Form in Natural Language\u003c\/em\u003e (1984), \u003cem\u003eKnowing Who\u003c\/em\u003e (with Steven Boer, 1986), \u003cem\u003eConsciousness\u003c\/em\u003e (1987), \u003cem\u003eJudgement and Justification\u003c\/em\u003e (1988), \u003cem\u003eModality and Meaning\u003c\/em\u003e (1994), \u003cem\u003eConsciousness and Experience\u003c\/em\u003e (1996), \u003cem\u003ePhilosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction\u003c\/em\u003e (Routledge 1999), and \u003cem\u003eReal Conditionals\u003c\/em\u003e (Oxford 2001).\n            \u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cstrong\u003eNumber of Pages:\u003c\/strong\u003e 160\u003c\/div\u003e\n            \u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cstrong\u003eDimensions:\u003c\/strong\u003e 0.6 x 8.6 x 5.6 IN\u003c\/div\u003e\n            \u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cstrong\u003ePublication Date:\u003c\/strong\u003e March 31, 2019\u003c\/div\u003e\n            ","brand":"BooksCloud","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":45853526229189,"sku":"9780198829720","price":121.41,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0757\/6718\/5605\/files\/NZsfq17qDd9780198829720_a82f81a3-5343-49bc-a15e-c78b4403028d.webp?v=1771464503","url":"https:\/\/selloorium.com\/products\/on-evidence-in-philosophy-hardcover-2","provider":"Selloorium","version":"1.0","type":"link"}