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by Stephen M. Beckett (Author)
On June 10, 1815, Napoleon dictated the final concentration orders for the invasion of Belgium - three balanced columns arranged for the march on Charleroi.
On June 12, Soult issued orders for the Arm e du Nord - three columns south of Maubeuge pointed at Mons. Why Soult did this has been a mystery for over 120 years.
On June 13, Napoleon countermanded Soult's orders, but the damage was done. Instead of advancing on June 14, as Napoleon planned, the campaign would be delayed a full day.
On June 14, as the French army moved into its final positions, French traitors tipped off the Prussians.
On June 15, as the French advanced, the Prussians were already concentrating.
On June 16, Wellington and Bl cher would meet in person. Napoleon's plans were wrecked. History has focused on Napoleon's opportunity to crush the Prussians at Ligny; however, Napoleon's plan was never possible. He was unaware of the dispositions of his left.
On June 18, the combined Allied armies would decisively defeat Napoleon at Waterloo - a battle discussed more than any other. Yet, the focus is entirely misplaced. While the drama is unparalleled, Napoleon's defeat in 1815 originated a week earlier, while Napoleon was still in Paris, and Soult failed to return to Laon.
Operations of the Arm e du Nord: 1815 is a four volume reference that has over 2,000 transcriptions of French correspondence from Napoleon's last army. Hundreds of pieces of correspondence are published for the first time due to spectacular discoveries of the last few years.
The Analysis explores numerous topics, answers many questions, and corrects major errors of the conventional history. It is the most important resource for French Operations in 1815 ever published.
