Additional information
by Musa Khan Jalalzai (Author)
The war in Ukraine experimented and assessed competency of Russian, Ukrainian and European intelligence agencies by their antithetical and divergent presuppositions. Moscow, Washington, Brussels and London miscalculated Ukrainian and Russian military power. Intelligence sharing among EU member states on this catastrophic war posed a dilemma. National Security threat perception and countering foreign espionage strategies in every member state was diversified while their response to international terrorism flattered underwhelming. Intelligence agencies in all EU member states were not sure of the reciprocation of their partners. Some states remarked their security was not under threat. Some intelligence agencies feared that their big partners might not share their national data on terrorism and radicalization. Mistrust and disinformation spread across Europe. In 2020, Boris Johnson's administration published Russian intelligence report, while in 2022, British intelligence agencies yelled on the interference of Russian and Chinese intelligence agencies. The issue of foreign espionage once more appeared in newspapers, and the British Domestic Intelligence Agency (MI5) abruptly announced that Chinese intelligence agents were making things worse. The MI5 said; "a female Chinese national was engaged in political interference activities on behalf of Beijing". The death of Alexander Litvinenko and attack on Sergei Skripal prompted development of new perceptions of fear that FSB, and GRU may possibly be interfering in domestic politics. Intelligence agencies across Europe and the UK maintained a very poor record of professional approach to the war in Ukraine. Foreign intelligence agencies in the UK and EU established different espionage, terrorist, and extremist networks to influence policy-making, target their critics and promote subversive activities.
