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by Remy Debes (Author)
The ideal that all humans deserve respect is almost universally accepted today. But how well do we live up to this ideal? Even in Western nations, where this moral ideal has become sacrosanct, we suffer daily reminders of our failures to live up to it. Sexism, racism, ableism, homophobia, transphobia, islamophobia, antisemitism: as soon as we declare progress in overcoming such attitudes, they regenerate with renewed vigor. What explains this moral inertia?
Drawing from a wide range of historically underrepresented voices, and real-life reflections, Remy Debes argues that we are missing something important when it comes to respect- and that our existing ideas are part of the problem. We are introduced to the concept of respect in childhood and quickly learn that respecting persons requires us to focus on the undifferentiated aspects of people. Each of us, we are told, is a rational agent, with autonomy and rights, and it is in this sense of personhood that we all deserve respect. The problem with this mindset, Debes argues, is that sometimes respecting persons - in the basic moral sense - requires deemphasizing what all persons have in common, in favor of what is different and unique about them. Sometimes, we are not calling out to be respected as a person in general, but as the specific person we are. The Possibility of Respect addresses the what and how of practicing respect on an individual basis, compares it to other kinds of demonstrations of respect, and explains how practicing this alternative, individual-focused way of thinking about respect might improve the outcomes of the multiple moral challenges facing us today.Author Biography
Remy Debes is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Memphis. He has published numerous articles and chapters on contemporary ethics and the history of ethics, with an emphasis on the subjects of human dignity, respect, empathy, emotion and the Scottish Enlightenment. He is the editor of Dignity: A History (Oxford University Press), co-editor of Ethical Sentimentalism (Cambridge University Press), and co-editor of The Smithian Mind, in the Routledge Philosophical Minds series. From 2017-2024 he was Editor-in-Chief of The Southern Journal of Philosophy.
